STUCK IN THE THICKET: Struggling with Interpretation and Application of
California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act
by Martin Baker
I. INTRODUCTION
California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (Penal Code
Sections 186.20 et seq.) was enacted in 1988 in response to a perceived “state of crisis . . .
caused by violent street gangs” throughout the state.1 Since its enactment, courts and
practitioners have struggled repeatedly to properly interpret and apply key provisions of
the Act.
The California Supreme Court has addressed various aspects of the Act on eleven
occasions.2 In the seventh of those cases, People v. Sengpadychith,3 a frustrated Court
began its opinion as follows:
Step by step, this court continues its struggle through the thicket of
statutory construction issues presented by the California Street Terrorism
and Prevention Act of 1988, also known as the STEP Act.4
In the five years since Sengpadychith was decided, the lower courts have
remained in disarray on several crucial aspects of the Act, and the Supreme Court has
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only briefly and cursorily revisited the “thicket.”5 Many of the problems at the root of
the widespread confusion amongst the Appellate Courts, however, seem soluble through
a common sense application of related case law and basic principles of statutory
construction.
II. THE KEY PROVISIONS OF THE STEP ACT
The two most widely used provisions of the STEP Act are Penal Code sections
186.22(a) and 186.22(b). Subdivision (a)—the “substantive gang charge”—criminalizes
criminal street gang membership rising to the level of “active participation,” while
subdivision (b)—the “gang enhancement”—increases penalties for felonies committed
with the intent to facilitate criminal gang activity.6
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III. “CRIMINAL STREET GANG”: DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS
A. The Existence of the Criminal Street Gang
Proof of either the substantive charge or the enhancement depends on the
prosecution first proving the existence and nature of the criminal street gang in question.7
“Criminal street gang” is defined in section 186.22(f) as
any ongoing organization, association or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs
(1) to (25), inclusive, of subdivision (e), having a common name or
common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity.8
The definitional problems with this requirement have largely revolved around the
following phrases from the statute:
! “any ongoing organization”
! “one of its primary activities”
! “pattern of criminal gang activity”
! “whose members”
B. “Any Ongoing Organization”: Umbrellas, Caravans, Cliques and Factions
In Northern California alone, there are hundreds of Hispanic street gangs, each
gang having anywhere from a handful to a hundreds of members.9 The gangs’
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membership is fluid, the gangs’ names change, and gangs migrate throughout the state.10
Thus, the transitory nature and changing membership of these neighborhood gangs can
make it difficult to prove that members of a specific, named gang have committed crimes
with the requisite frequency and consistency for the gang to meet the statutory definition
of a criminal street gang.
The nature of Californian Hispanic street gangs in particular raises unique
problems of pleading and proof. Almost all Californian Hispanic street gangs fall into
one of two categories: norteno and sureno;11 norteno gangs are predominant in Northern
California, while sureno gangs are predominant in Southern California.12 The norteno
gangs tend to wear red and display the number 14 (for the letter “N”).13 The sureno
gangs wear blue and display the number 13 (for the letter “M” for Mexican Mafia—the
reputed prison gang predecessor and now current ally of sureno gangs).14 Although the
numerous gangs on each side share common philosophies (dominance over encroaching
or potentially encroaching gangs from the opposite side), as well as similar color
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preferences and symbols, few of the neighborhood gangs on each side engage in any
coordinated collaborative enterprises.15
Many of these small gangs adopt neighborhood-specific names, such as the
“Barrio North Side” gang16 or the “Kilbreth Street Norteno”17 gang. The significance of
the upper case “N” in “Kilbreth Street Norteno” is that the gang’s members have created
a proper name for a (lower case “n”) norteno gang, i.e., a gang whose members share the
Californian Hispanic “northerner” philosophy.
Despite the discrete and apparently autonomous nature of these numerous, small
Hispanic “neighborhood” gangs, prosecutors frequently elect to charge defendants as
active participants in, or facilitating the criminal activities of, simply, “the Nortenos,” or
“the Surenos.” The reason for this is obvious; there are thousands of sureno and norteno
gang members in California,18 and if every neighborhood gang can be shown to be
nothing more than a subordinate “set” or “clique” forming just a tiny part of a vast
unitary “Sureno Gang” or “Norteno Gang,” the task of proving the existence of the gang
becomes a hundred times easier when a complaint alleges participation in, or facilitation
of criminal activity by “the Surenos” or “the Nortenos.”

15

NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations (2005), at
p.8 (quoting Sergeant Wes McBride).

16

See People v. Valdez, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 140 (1997).

17

See In re Jose P., 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (2003).

18

See National Drug Intelligence Center California Northern and Eastern Districts Drug Threat
Assessment (January 2001) (“the California Department of Justice estimates there could be as many as
170,000 Hispanic gang members in California, ranging in age from 14 to 41”). Available at
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs/653/meth.htm.

5

The doubtful existence of a vast unitary “Norteno” or “Sureno” gang overseeing
hundreds of smaller “sub-gangs” was first addressed on appeal in People v. Valdez.19 Mr.
Valdez was one of a number of youths gathered together from various norteno gangs for
the one-time purpose of attacking some sureno gang members.20 The Valdez court held
that the group could not be proven to be a street gang by resort to evidence of prior
activities drawn from the entire population of norteno gang members, because—
according to the testimony of the gang expert at trial—“Norteno and Sureno are not the
names of gangs.”21 The group was neither a norteno gang, nor was it part of a greater
“Norteno gang”; instead, it was merely a “caravan” of nortenos taken from seven
different norteno gangs.22
In contrast, the prosecution gang expert in In re Jose P.23 testified at trial that
various Salinas area norteno gangs were, in fact, “cliques or factions within the larger
Norteno gang”24 and that the cliques were “loyal to one another and to the larger Norteno
street gang.”25 The appellant in In re Jose P. cited People v. Valdez26 for the proposition
that “evidence of gang activity must be specific to a particular local street gang, not to the
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larger Norteno organization.”27 The Jose P. court, however, held that expert testimony in
one case does not necessarily apply to another, and that in this case the expert testified
that there was indeed one unitary Norteno gang, of which the Salinas area norteno gangs
were merely subordinate “subgroups.”28
Although law enforcement experts consistently testify at trial that the terms
“Norteno” and “Sureno” are the names of vast unitary gangs, rather than adjectives used
to describe discrete small gangs with similar raisons d’etre, no published texts support
the law enforcement position. In fact, the few reputable published materials addressing
the composition of Californian Hispanic street gangs soundly contradict the view that
Norteno and Sureno are two huge unitary gangs. For example, Sergeant Wes McBride—
president of the California Gang Investigators Association—wrote in the 1999 edition of
the Dispatcher:
A common misunderstanding is that these two movements [norteno and
sureno] are in fact two large gangs controlling California. In fact, they are
only street gangs from divergent geographical locations that have adopted
opposing philosophical divisions that exist in many states between
northern and southern regions.29
Sergeant McBride’s view, while apparently not shared by many testifying officers,
is shared by the National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations. The NAGIA’s
2005 National Gang Threat Assessment report noted the following:
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. . . Surenos (Southerners) and Nortenos (Northerners) [are] umbrella
terms for Hispanic street gangs in California [] used to distinguish whether the
gang is from the northern or southern part of the state . . . .30
Sureno, or Sur 13, is a banner under which most southern
California Hispanic gangs gather . . . .31
[T]he term norteno is used to describe an entire category of
California street gangs . . . .32
[J]ust as Sureno gangs are not aligned with each other, Norteno gangs are
not necessarily aligned with other Nortenos.33
Furthermore, in the law-enforcement oriented “Gang Intelligence Manual,” Bill
Valentine observed that “[Sur-13 and Norte-14] are generic terms only. There are
hundreds of active Sureno gangs that regard each other as enemies, just as there are
Norteno gangs that do.”34
If it is true, as reported in the NAGIA’s 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment,
that “the terms nortenos and surenos are no longer sufficient to describe California street
gangs,”35 then it is also no longer sufficient to charge California street gang members as
simply “Nortenos” or “Surenos.”
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C. “Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity”: Predicate Acts
To prove the existence of the gang, it must be shown that “the gang’s members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity.”36 This “pattern” must be shown by proof of
the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or
solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more of
[thirty specified “enumerated”] offenses, provided at least one of these offenses
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses
occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the offenses were committed
on separate occasions, or by two or more persons.37
The enumerated offenses include many “serious”38 and “violent”39 felonies, as
well as ordinarily less serious offenses, such as grand theft and felony vandalism.40 To
meet the statutory requirements of number (two or more) and timing (within three years
of each other), prosecutors typically use the charged offense as the most recent, and one
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extortion . . . (20) Felony vandalism . . . (21) Carjacking . . . (22) The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm,
as defined in Section 12072 (23) Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other [concealed firearm] . . . (24)
Threats to commit crimes resulting in death or great bodily injury, as defined in Section 422 (25) Theft and
unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, as defined in section 10851 of the Vehicle Code (26) Felony theft
of an access card or account information, as defined in Section 484e (27) Counterfeiting, designing, using,
attempting to use an access card, as defined in Section 484f (28) Felony fraudulent use of an access card or
account information, as defined in Section 484g (29) Unlawful use of personal identifying information to
obtain credit, goods, services, or medical information, as defined in Section 530.5 (30) Wrongfully
obtaining Department of Motor Vehicles documentation, as defined in Section 529.7. CAL. PEN. CODE §
186.22(e) (West 2006).
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or more predicate offenses (i.e., offenses of a type enumerated in the Act) committed by
the defendant or other gang members resulting in convictions41 and having occurred
within the preceding three years.
Although the charged offense and only one prior will suffice as a “pattern of
criminal gang activity,”42 prosecutors frequently allege more. One reason is that, should
the defendant be acquitted of the offense supporting the gang enhancement, there would
then need to be a minimum two prior predicate acts proven in order to convict on the
substantive gang charge. Also, a litany of prior gang offenses serves the additional
purposes of proving that the gang has as one of its primary activities the commission of
one or more of the enumerated crimes,43 and that the defendant had knowledge of the
gang’s criminal activities.44
Two problems arise out of the “pattern” requirement. One is purely
interpretational, while the other concerns the use of expert witnesses’ testimony at trial.
Although the statutory language appears clear; “whose members individually or
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,”45 the
Courts of Appeal have held that the predicate acts need not be gang related, nor do the
people committing the predicate offenses need to be gang members at the time of the
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acts’ commission.46 Can the existence of a gang really be proven by evidence of nongang-related crimes committed years before the perpetrator even considers joining the
gang? Surely this is not what the Augborne court meant to say.
Prosecution “experts”—who are not usually qualified as experts in legislative
history —further abuse the “predicate acts” requirement at trial by confidently asserting
that the enumerated crimes were selected because the Legislature deemed them to be
“gang crimes.” This is simply not so. Nevertheless, trial courts invariably allow
prosecution gang experts to improperly imply, by characterizing the statutorily
enumerated offenses as per se “gang crimes,” that street gang members are more prone to
commit those offenses than other groups or individuals.
D. “One of its Primary Activities”: How Criminal Are Criminal Street Gangs?
To prove the existence of the gang, the prosecution must also prove that the gang
has “as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, of subdivision (e).”47
“Primary” is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as “first or highest in
rank, quality or importance.”48 If the statute said “as its primary activity” then there
would be no difficulty in applying that definition. The problem is that the statute says
“one of its primary activities,”49 defying the commonly understood definition of
“primary” as the first or highest in rank, quality or importance. So, how can several
activities be first or highest in rank, quality or importance? In 2001, thirteen years after
46
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the enactment of the STEP Act, the California Supreme Court addressed the definitional
issue of “primary activities” in People v. Sengpadychith.50 The Court looked to
Webster’s International Dictionary and found that Webster’s listed “chief” and
“principal” as synonyms.51 But instead of attempting to solve the conundrum of multiple
“primary” activities, the Court proceeded to ratify the grammatical contradiction in the
statute with more word abuse of the exact same kind by stating that “one of its primary
activities”52 means the same as “one of its ‘chief’ or ‘principal’ occupations.”53
Not only did the Supreme Court compound the problem of multiple primary
activities during its foray into the linguistic thicket of the STEP Act, courtesy of
Sengpadychith,54 but it also took the following muddled stab at providing a clearer
standard for frequency of primary activities:
Sufficient proof of the gang’s primary activities might consist of evidence
that the group’s members consistently and repeatedly have committed
criminal activity listed in the gang statute. Also sufficient might be expert
testimony, as occurred in Gardeley. [Citation] There, a police gang
expert testified that the gang . . . was primarily engaged in the sale of
narcotics and witness intimidation, both statutorily enumerated
felonies . . . . The gang expert based his opinion on conversations he had
with Gardeley and fellow gang members, and on “his personal
investigation of hundreds of crimes committed by gang members,”
together with information from colleagues in his own police department
and in other law enforcement agencies.55
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The first sentence alone might have gone some way toward clarifying what kind
of evidence proves that the commission of enumerated crimes is one of the gang’s
primary activities, had the Court said “must” and not “might.” But even if some value
were assigned to that first sentence by reading “might” as “must” (or even, “should”),
that value is diminished, if not negated entirely, by the second sentence, which appears to
suggests that expert testimony can prove primary activities in a way that falls short of the
consistent and repeated commission of enumerated acts. Nevertheless, the Court’s use of
italics in the first sentence certainly implies that the Court placed some importance on the
“consistently and repeatedly” phrase, and presumably did not intend to lessen that
importance by allowing proof by a different means of a lesser degree of activity than
“consistent[] and repeated[]” commission of enumerated crimes. The most reasonable
interpretation of this part of the Sengpadychith opinion, therefore, is that the “primary
activities” element must be proven by evidence that the gang’s members consistently and
repeatedly committed enumerated acts, and that the same standard may be met by
evidence presented in the form of expert testimony, as occurred in Gardeley.56 Any other
reading of this passage would essentially render it useless in its entirety.
Implicit in the “primary activities” requirement is the notion that gangs must be,
at the very least, more criminally active than society at large. No matter how tempting it
is to assume that popular preconceptions about gangs are true, high levels of criminality
among gangs must still be demonstrated reliably at trial to prove this requirement. The
question is how? In practice, gang experts routinely present a list of gang crimes which
have occurred in the county in recent years and then proceed to state that based on their

56
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experience investigating gang crime, the primary activities of Gang X are the commission
of this crime, that crime, and the other crime—all enumerated in the statute.57 This kind
of conclusory anecdotal evidence—impressive as it is to a jury—tells us nothing about
the per capita crime rate of gang members versus non-gang members without any
accompanying information as to the percentage of gang members among the local
population, and local crime rates among gang members versus the general population, or
among other groups or organizations.
In People v. Gamez (1991),58 the defendant claimed that the statutory definition of
criminal street gang could easily encompass such organizations as the Los Angeles Police
Department.59 The Court of Appeal countered that, although members of the LAPD may
have committed the requisite number of predicate offenses,60 the commission of those
offenses was not a “primary activity” of the department because the crimes were
committed by LAPD officers acting in a separate capacity, albeit while on duty.61 The
Gamez court’s conclusion seemed to be based on the capacity of the perpetrators of the
enumerated crimes, rather than the rank, quality or importance ascribed to the conduct.
However, when the Supreme Court visited the primary activities issue a decade later in

57
CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2006). As of 2005, twenty-five offenses were enumerated. The list
was commonly referred to in gang officers’ vernacular as “the dirty twenty-five.” Not surprisingly, since
its recent expansion to thirty crimes, it is now referred to even more commonly as “the dirty thirty.”
58

286 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1991).

59

Gamez at 901.

60

The Gamez opinion somewhat portentously predated the Los Angeles Police Department “Rampart
Scandal,” wherein LAPD anti-gang CRASH Unit officers were convicted of several serious felonies,
including bank robbery and theft of seized cocaine. See Rampart Scandal Timeline at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/cron.html.
61

Gamez at 901.
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Sengpadychith,62 it appeared to cite Gamez for the proposition that organizations such as
the LAPD are not criminal street gangs because enumerated offenses are committed by
members only on an “occasional” basis.63
If the LAPD is not a criminal street gang because its members appear to commit
enumerated crimes only occasionally, couldn’t the same be said for norteno and sureno
street gangs, absent any evidence to the contrary? Despite popular preconceptions of
gangs consisting of hordes of marauding superpredators,64 the reality, according to one
expert, is that gang life is “a very dull life. For the most part, gang members do very
little—sleep, get up late, hang around, brag a lot, eat again, drink, hang around some
more.”65
Even if it can be proven that a disproportionate number of crimes are committed
by gang members, that fact would not necessarily prove a causal relationship between
gangs and crime. If already delinquent youths join gangs and continue to commit crimes
at the same level as if they had not joined the gang, then a distinction can be made
between the primary activity of the gang, and the primary activities of its members.66
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27 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2001).
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Sengpadychith at 744.
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See John J. DiIulio Jr., The Coming of the Superpredators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, November 27, 1995,
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juvenile super-predators” who “fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment” and “live by
the meanest code of the meanest streets”).
65

M.W. Klein, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG, (Oxford University Press 1995), at p.11.
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See Finn-Aage Esbensen, Preventing Adolescent Gang Involvement, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, September
2000, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, at pp.5-6. Esbensen noted that research suggested that “while the gang environment facilitates
delinquency, gang members are already delinquent prior to joining the gang.” Esbensen also noted,
however, that “rates of delinquency increase dramatically during the period of gang membership.” See also
James C. Howell, Youth Gangs: An Overview, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, August 1998, U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Justice Programs Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. A 1997 survey
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Unlike the “pattern of criminal gang activity” requirement, which must be proven by
evidence of “members individually or collectively” committing enumerated offenses,67
the “primary activities” requirement must be proven by evidence of “its [i.e., the gang’s]
primary activities [being] the commission of one or more of the [enumerated] criminal
acts.”68
The notion that Hispanic street gangs may merely provide an attractive means of
association for the independently criminally minded is supported by the available
statistical data. In 2000, Hispanics made up 12.5 percent of the United States’
population,69 and 49 percent of the nation’s street gang membership.70 Thus, Hispanics
were more than six times more likely to be in a gang than non-Hispanics. Based on the
foregoing, if gang membership substantially contributes to criminality (rather than vice
versa), then one would expect to find noticeably disproportionate Hispanic per capita
crime rates, especially in regions with a large Hispanic population. However, one recent
sampling of local inmates broken down by race tends to refute this assumption. During
late May of 2006, the male population detained in Stanislaus County’s Modesto Men’s
Jail and Public Safety Center was divided between 45 percent Hispanic and 55 percent

of Denver, Colorado youth found that the 14% of teenagers who claimed to be gang members were
responsible for 89% of all serious violent juvenile offenses.
67

CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
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CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
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Elizabeth M. Grieco & Rachel C. Cassidy, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin, Census 2000 Brief,
U.S. Census Bureau (March 2000).

70

Arlen Egley Jr. & Aline K. Major, National Youth Gang Survey 2001, United States Department of
Justice.
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non-Hispanic.71 In Stanislaus County generally, males between ages 18 and 40 were
divided at that time between approximately 42 percent Hispanic and 58 percent nonHispanic.72
The closeness of the in-custody and out-of-custody figures indicates that Hispanic
males as a class are negligibly more criminal than non-Hispanic males. This in-custody
racial parity further shows that the reputed high level of gang membership amongst
Hispanics has little impact on the overall Hispanic per capita crime rate. Rather, a
disproportionate representation of gang members within a proportionately represented
Hispanic in-custody population would indicate that instead of gang formation causing
increased criminality, as popularly believed, the opposite may be true; gang members are
already predisposed toward criminal activity, and an individual’s membership within a
gang has little impact upon his continuing criminality.
In light of the wealth of statistical information available, and the conclusions that
can be drawn from it, courts deserve more than the anecdotal evidence deemed sufficient
in Gardeley to prove “primary activities.”73 Instead of police officers’ lurid recitations of
highlights from the gang unit’s water cooler, courts and juries should be hearing more
meaningful testimony from social scientists and demographers as to the relationship
between gang membership/formation and crime—especially when it is likely that while
gang members might be delinquently oriented, the existence of the gang has little to do
with their levels of criminality.
71

Based on daily jail rosters provided in response to subpoena duces tecum in People v. Torres, Stanislaus
County Superior Court case # 1092534.
72

Based on California Department of Finance Demographic Research Unit estimates, available at
http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/DRU_datafiles/Race/RaceData_2000-2050.htm.
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IV. “ACTIVE PARTICIPATION”: WHAT IS A GANG MEMBER?
Active participation in a criminal street gang in violation of Penal Code section
186.22(a) is punishable as a felony or as a misdemeanor.74 A felony conviction under
section 186.22(a) counts as a “strike” under California’s Three Strikes Law75 and carries
a maximum punishment of three years in state prison.76
Subdivision (a)—the “substantive gang charge”—proscribes active participation
“in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged
in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers or assists in
any felonious conduct by members of that gang . . .”77
Relying on the United States Supreme Court case of Scales v. United States,78 the
California Supreme Court in People v. Castaneda79 held that subdivision (a) required that
the defendant was more than a nominal or passive member, the defendant had knowledge
of the gang’s members’ involvement in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and that the
defendant willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted in criminal conduct by gang
members.80 The Castaneda court held that “willful promot[ion], further[ance], or

74

A crime punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor is commonly known as a “wobbler.”

75

As a “serious felony” within the meaning of California Penal Code section 1192.7(c).
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Like many felonies, the mitigated term is sixteen months, the mid term is two years, and the aggravated
term is three years. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2006).
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Castaneda at 284-285.
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assist[ance] in criminal gang conduct” was equivalent to “aid[ing] and abet[ting] a
separate felony offense committed by gang members.”81
Despite the clear language of the Castaneda opinion, lower courts have since held
that the promotion/furtherance/assistance prong may be satisfied by a defendant
committing the charged offense82 (as opposed to a “separate offense”83) alone or as a
direct perpetrator84 (as opposed to “aiding and abetting”85). In People v. Ngoun,86 the
Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized that the “gravamen of [the substantive offense]
is the participation in the gang itself”87 (citing People v. Herrera88), but went on to state
that someone acting alone could satisfy the promotion/furtherance/assistance prong
because “an active gang member who directly perpetrates a gang-related offense
‘contributes’ to the accomplishment of the offense no less than does an active gang
member who aids or abets or who is otherwise connected to such conduct.”89
What the Ngoun court missed, despite its reference to Herrera,90 is that inherent
in the concept of “participation” in a gang is interaction or collaboration with other gang
members, hence the unambiguous requirement in Castaneda that the defendant be proven
81

Castaneda at 283.
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People v. McMahon, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 256 (2005).
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Castaneda at 283.
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Ngoun at 839.

88

83 Cal.Rptr.2d 307 (1999).
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to have aided and abetted other gang members on a separate occasion.91 The Court of
Appeal in Ngoun concluded its opinion by inviting the CALJIC committee to abandon its
paraphrasing of Castaneda’s “aid and abet” language and revise it to conform with the
Ngoun “direct perpetration” holding.92
Just recently, in People v. Lamas,93 the Fourth District Court of Appeal, citing
Ngoun, similarly held that direct perpetration of the charged offense by a gang member
would be sufficient to meet the promote/further/assist requirement of section 186.22(a),
dismissing the “aid and abet a separate felony” language of Castaneda as “an oftmisinterpreted snippet . . . ripped from its context.”94
Five years after the Ngoun court’s invitation to conform the relevant jury
instruction to its holding, such a change has yet to occur. CALCRIM 1400 (the recent
successor to CALJIC 6.50) retains the “aid and abet” language of Castaneda95 and does
not mention direct perpetration.96
As well as the confusion amongst lower courts as to what the Supreme Court
really meant when it said when it said that a defendant “must aid and abet a separate

91

Castaneda at 283.
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Ngoun at 840.
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*Cal.Rptr.3d* (June 20, 2006).

94

Lamas at *.
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2006) (“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime the People must prove that . . . [a] member of the
gang committed the crime . . . , the defendant knew the gang member intended to commit the crime . . . ,
the gang member intended to aid and abet the gang member in committing the crime [and] the defendant’s
words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the commission of the crime”).
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felony offense committed by gang members”97 to be convicted under 186.22(a), there
remains a far more serious unresolved interpretational problem: the meaning of “gang
member,” a term peppered throughout the STEP Act, yet undefined anywhere in the
Penal Code.
Under the STEP Act, a criminal street gang is an organization “whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity.”98 To be convicted of violating section 186.22(a), a defendant must have
“knowledge that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity”99 and must “willfully promote[], further[] or assist[] in any felonious
conduct by members of that gang.”100 To sustain a penalty enhancement under section
186.22(b), a defendant must commit a felony with “the specific intent to promote, further,
or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.”101
The enactment of the STEP Act in 1988 was not the first time that the term “gang
member” had been used in a penal statute without definition. Sixty-seven years ago, in
Lanzetta v. New Jersey,102 the defendant challenged as constitutionally vague a 1934 New
Jersey law punishing “any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons . . . .”103 The United States
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Supreme Court held that the statute violated due process because its terms were “so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.”104 One of the unconstitutionally vague terms in the statute was the
term “known to be a member.”105 The Supreme Court found two problems with this term;
one was whether the word “known” required actual membership or whether reputed
membership was sufficient,106 the other problem with the term was that the statute failed
to indicate “what constitutes membership or how one may join” a gang.107
The STEP Act’s abundant use of the undefined term “gang member” was attacked
for vagueness in the 1991 case of People v. Green.108 Notwithstanding the fatal
constitutional problems that the United States Supreme Court had found with the same
undefined term over half a century earlier, the Green court declared that “member” and
“membership” were “terms of ordinary meaning and require[d] no further definition.”109
Further, declared the Green court, “member” had been judicially defined by the United
State Supreme Court in Galvan v. Press110 as a person “bear[ing] a relationship to an
organization that is not accidental, artificial or unconsciously in appearance only.”111
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What the Green court failed to appreciate was that while the term “member” might not
require further definition, “gang member” might.
In Galvan v. Press,112 the Supreme Court held that aliens could be deported under
the Internal Security Act of 1950 if they had become members of the Communist
Party.113 All that was required was that the alien was “aware that he was joining an
organization known as the Communist Party which operates as a distinct and active
political organization, and that he did so of his own free will.”114 There was no need to
show that the alien knew of the Party’s advocacy of the violent overthrow of the United
States Government.115 Thus, the issue in Galvan—like Scales and unlike Lanzetta—was
not the method of acquiring membership, but the depth of membership, once acquired.
Distinguishing Lanzetta, the Green court noted that, unlike the New Jersey law,
the STEP Act did not use the term “known” and therefore the STEP Act’s references to
“gang members” referred to actual gang members.116 The fact that the STEP Act, like
the New Jersey statute in Lanzetta, fails to indicate how one might join a gang had,
according to the Green court, been resolved by cases such as Scales “which also involved
[a statute] failing to specify those acts by which a person might be deemed a member.”117
The Green court’s reference to Scales is unhelpful in that Scales, like Galvan, turned on
the issue of the depth of the defendant’s membership, not the method of acquiring
112
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Galvan at 525.

114

Galvan at 528.

115

Galvan at 530.

116

People v. Green, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, 146 (1991)

117

Green at 146.
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membership, something which was recognized in Lanzetta as the first step in defining
membership of a street gang—a type of organization which, unlike the Communist Party
and most other political organizations, does not collect a membership fee or hand out
membership cards.118
In People v. Englebrecht,119 the Court of Appeal faced a similar challenge to that
raised in Lanzetta and Green, but in the context of a civil injunction enjoining “members”
of the Posole street gang from engaging in certain collective activities amounting to a
public nuisance.120 The Englebrecht court rejected the defendant’s argument that “gang
member” should be considered synonymous with “active participant” as defined in Green
as one who “devotes all, or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang,”121 as
well as the prosecution’s argument that the court should adopt as a judicial definition the
criteria used by law enforcement to validate and document youths as “gang members.”122
Instead, the Englebrecht court defined “gang member” as an “active gang member,” i.e.,
one who meets a similar definition of “active participant” under section 186.22(a) except
that, in the context of a civil injunction, the gang has as its primary activities the acts
constituting the public nuisance, and instead of engaging in a pattern of criminal activity,
118

See Gangs; A Community Response, California Attorney General’s Office Crime and Violence
Prevention Center (June 2003), at p.28 (describing how gang members are “jumped in” to a gang by
submitting to a gang beating. Other methods of acquiring membership include “sponsorship” by an
existing member, or completion of a criminal “assignment”).
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member of the gang (2) Subject has tattoos, clothing, etc., that are only associated with certain gangs (3)
Subject has been arrested while participating with a known gang (4) Information that places the subject
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been confirmed. See Englebrecht at 753.
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the gang’s members engage in the acts constituting the public nuisance.123 Also, “[t]he
participation must be more than nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical.”124 Thus,
the Englebrecht “active gang member” formulation fell somewhere between the noncriminal “inactive” or “passive” member and the criminal “active participant.”
A version of the Englebrecht “active member” definition would, at first glance,
seem appropriate in the context of the STEP Act. Unfortunately, such a definition
compels infinite regression, ultimately rendering it unusable; for example, if a gang
member is defined as somebody who has associated in some way with another gang
member, then at some point in history there has to be an immaculately conceived gang
member, i.e., a person who became a gang member without any association with an
existing gang member.
The Green court may have been correct when it stated that “member” is a term of
ordinary meaning requiring no further definition, but as long as gangs do not hand out
membership cards, the term “gang member” remains just as vulnerable to diverse
definitions today as it did sixty-seven years ago in Lanzetta.125 Therefore, the entire
STEP Act likely violates due process because its terms are not “sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties.”126
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V. THE ENHANCEMENT: FACILITATING WHAT, WHOM AND WHEN?
Penal Code section 186.22(b) provides for enhanced penalties for defendants
proven to have committed felonies “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with a criminal street gang,” and “with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in
any criminal conduct by gang members.”127
Although the language of the enhancement statute—“promote, further, or assist in
any criminal conduct by gang members”—appears almost identical to the “willfully
promotes, furthers or assists in any felonious conduct by members of that gang” language
of subdivision (a) (the substantive “active participation” charge), the two provisions have
been interpreted somewhat differently. While the language in the (a) count refers to
aiding and abetting a felony committed by gang members,128 the almost identical
language in the (b) enhancement refers (at least, according to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals) to “facilitation”129 of “any criminal conduct by gang members.”130
Until recently, the primary problem with the enhancement (apart from the lack of
a statutory definition for the term “gang member”) has been one of attenuation; exactly
how much of a nexus must be shown between the charged act and the facilitated criminal
gang conduct? In People v. Ferraez,131 the defendant was a member of a gang and was
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CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(b) (West 2006).

128

At least according the California Supreme Court in People v. Castaneda, 3 P.3d 278, 283 (Cal. 2000) .
But see People v. Ngoun, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 839-840 (2001); People v. Lamas, *Cal.Rptr.3d* (June 20,
2006).

129

See Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2005).

130

CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

131

5 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 (2003).

26

selling drugs in a gang neighborhood with permission from the gang.132 Although it
could be said that the defendant committed the offense “in association with a criminal
street gang” by seeking the gang’s approval, there appeared to be no direct or
circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to “promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members”; rather, the defendant appeared to be selling drugs
purely for personal profit.133 This evidentiary deficit was easily remedied, however, by
the testimony of the prosecution gang expert who testified to the effect that gang
members typically sell drugs to raise money for criminal gang activity or to enhance the
gang’s criminal reputation, therefore this gang member defendant intended just that.134
Despite the faulty logic of this syllogism—akin to “most pets are cats; I have a pet dog;
therefore my dog is a cat”—the court had no problem relying on the expert’s opinion to
prove the ultimate issue of the defendant’s intent to facilitate criminal conduct by the
gang.135
As well as the all-purpose “enhancing the gang’s reputation” theory, prosecution
experts also employ the equally versatile “protecting turf” theory to “prove” that an
apparently self-serving crime was actually committed to facilitate gang activity. The
“turf” theory, however, was soundly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Garcia v. Carey.136
In Garcia, the defendant proudly announced his gang affiliation while robbing his victim
132
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in a busy liquor store.137 The defendant was assisted by two other gang members.138 At
trial, the prosecution gang expert testified that the robbery occurred on Garcia’s gang’s
“turf,” and that the gang was “turf oriented.”139 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference that Mr. Garcia robbed his
victim “with the specific intent to facilitate other criminal conduct by the gang.”140 The
court noted that there was nothing in the record connecting the “‘turf-oriented nature’ of
the gang” with the commission of that robbery, nor was there any evidence that
protection of turf enabled any other kind of criminal activity of the gang; the expert’s
testimony was “singularly silent on what criminal activity of the gang was furthered or
intended to be furthered by the robbery . . . .”141
Not only have state courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s requirement of an
articulable nexus between the charged offense and specific criminal gang activity, but the
Second District Court of Appeal’s recent decision in People v. Romero142 conflicted with
Garcia on another important aspect of the enhancement provision, holding that
subdivision (b) “does not require intent to further criminal conduct beyond the charged
crime.”143
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In Romero, two gang members, Mr. Romero and Mr. Moreno, were convicted of
murder, with a sustained enhancement under section 186.22(b).
The Romero court reasoned, contrary to Garcia, that the “any criminal conduct”
language of the statute could be applied to contemporaneous conduct of another gang
member committing the same offense;144 each defendant acted in association with the
gang and had the specific intent to assist in criminal gang conduct simply by virtue of
assisting the other in the commission of the charged offense, even if the charged offense
was not otherwise gang-related. The Romero court cited People v. Morales145 in support
of the position that when there is sufficient evidence that a defendant intended to commit
a crime in association with other gang members, “it is fairly inferable that he intended to
assist criminal conduct by his fellow gang members.”146
The Romero court’s interpretation of subdivision (b) creates the potential for
unjust and absurd results.147 What if Mr. Moreno were not a gang member? Mr. Moreno
would then be the only one out of the two defendants actually assisting a gang member,
thus freeing Mr. Romero—the gang member—of liability under the enhancement, and
imposing liability instead upon Mr. Moreno—the non-gang member. The only way
around this unjust and absurd result would be to construe the holding of Romero to mean
that one gang member can meet the “assist[ing] in any criminal conduct by gang
members” element of the enhancement by assisting in his own commission of any crime
as a gang member. Such an interpretation would avoid the potential absurdity of a non144
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gang member facing greater liability than a gang member for the same conduct, and
would be in conformity with the Ngoun and Lamas courts’ application of the “promote,
further, or assist” language of the subdivision (a) substantive count to lone gang members
committing any crime. However, this interpretation of the “promote, further, or assist”
language—i.e., that a lone gang member could be subjected to additional punishment
when committing a self-serving crime, simply by virtue of his unrelated gang
affiliation—would appear to unconstitutionally punish mere membership in a gang when
applied to the (b) enhancement.148
The Romero court purported to cite People v. Morales149 in support of its position
that crimes committed by multiple gang members presumptively satisfy all the
requirements of the enhancement. However, such reliance on Morales was somewhat
selective. The Morales court offered the following caveat, consistent with the notion that
gang members (even when acting together) can commit self-serving crimes not intended
to facilitate criminal gang conduct: “[I]t is conceivable that several gang members could
commit a crime together, yet be on a frolic and detour unrelated to the gang.”150
The “frolic and detour” exception posited by the Morales court in dicta is
something that should not be shoved into oblivion by Ferraez, Romero, and their
inevitable progeny; despite attempts by the courts to validate the flawed logic of
prosecution gang experts, it always has been and always will be entirely possible for gang
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members, acting alone or in groups, to commit self-serving crimes without any intent to
facilitate criminal gang activity. And it remains the prosecution’s burden to prove with
competent evidence that the charged offense—not that particular type of offense, when
committed by a gang member—was committed with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.
VI. CONCLUSION: A WAY OUT OF THE THICKET?
The uniqueness of gang culture, the linguistic shoddiness of a statute cobbled
together in a hasty response to a gang “crisis,” and the puzzling judicial interpretations of
the STEP Act’s provisions by confused and frustrated courts have rendered the Act
virtually impossible to apply in a fair and consistent manner.
The growing problems of interpretation, as shown by the continuing divergence of
appellate opinions, can likely be solved only by a radical redrafting of the statute. By far
the largest flaw in the Act is the conspicuous lack of a definition of “gang member.” An
amendment to the statute to add a simple definition comparable to those used by law
enforcement agencies when documenting gang members on the street would easily
suffice.151 Also, the disagreement among appellate courts as to whether direct
perpetration or only aiding and abetting satisfies the “assistance” prong of the substantive
charge, and whether the enhancement requires facilitation of other criminal gang activity,
could be resolved by resort to codification of the holdings of the higher courts,
specifically the holding of Castaneda as to “aiding and abetting,” and the holding of
Garcia v. Carey as to “other criminal gang activity.”
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Eighteen years after the enactment of the STEP Act, there is still a dire need for
comprehensible legislative and judicial standards in the war against gangs. The recurring
disagreement among the appellate courts is sufficient evidence that some of the state’s
brightest legal scholars remain at odds as to the “plain meaning” of the statute.
As the gang crisis continues to grow, so does the need for clear legal standards to
assist in the effort to quell that crisis. It is not too late for courts and the legislature to
map a way out of the thicket.
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